Verified protection model of the seL4 microkernel
Authors
School of Computer Science and Engineering
University of New South Wales
Sydney 2052 Australia
NICTA, Sydney,
Australia
Abstract
This paper presents a machine-checked high-level security analysis of seL4 --- an evolution of the L4 kernel series targeted to secure, embedded devices. We provide an abstract specification of the seL4 access control system in terms of a classical take-grant model together with a formal proof of its decidability. Using the decidability property we show how confined subsystems can be enforced. All proofs and specifications in this paper are machine-checked and developed in the interactive theorem prover Isabelle/HOL.
BibTeX Entry
@techreport{Elkaduwe_GE_07,
title = {Verified Protection Model of the {seL4} Microkernel},
author = {Dhammika Elkaduwe and Gerwin Klein and Kevin Elphinstone},
number = {NRL-1474},
month = {Oct},
note = {Available from \url{http://ertos.nicta.com.au/publications/papers/Elkaduwe_GE_07.pdf}},
year = {2007},
institution = {NICTA}
}

